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 Chapter 14 
 Epilogue: Can Capitalists Reform Themselves? 
 Chrystia  Freeland 
 Abstract  After spending a decade as a journalist writing about rising income 
inequality and 2 years as an elected politician trying to do something about it, the 
author is convinced that the best chance that progressives have of bending the arc of 
the twenty-fi rst century economy is with a message of inclusive prosperity. That 
means wholeheartedly embracing capitalism while ensuring that the wealth it cre-
ates is broadly shared. It also means embracing capitalists and convincing them that 
they, too, will benefi t when others get a bigger slice of the pie. The moment is ripe 
for action. But a confrontational strategy of framing the plight of the twenty-fi rst 
century middle class as a zero-sum political battle, one where the plutocrats have 
been winning at everyone else’s expense, is not the answer. The stunning 2015 elec-
tion failure of Great Britain’s Labour Party serves as evidence to that effect. Most 
Americans understand that capitalism works as an economic system—just not as a 
social one—and that many of our most successful capitalists are the people respon-
sible for its effectiveness. Thus the key is for plutocrats to realize it is in their best 
interest—and everyone else’s—to participate in the solution by paying higher taxes. 
Such a stance has precedent. In the post-World War II era, civic-minded American 
business leaders were willing to advocate and pay increased taxes even though rates 
were much higher than they are now. 
 Keywords  Capitalism •  Inclusive prosperity •  Income inequality •  Progressivism • 
 Plutocrats •  American Dream 
 One summer day in 2015, I stood on an elegant stone deck overlooking a swimming 
pool on one side and a lush well-tended garden on the other. Behind me was a three- 
story brick mansion, easily worth $10 million, and in front of me was a group of 
Toronto’s 1 %, including a couple of Canada’s wealthiest businessmen. My job was 
to persuade them to vote for me, and for my party, which is promising to raise taxes 
on the rich to pay for a tax cut and more benefi ts for the middle class and the poor. 
 I won’t pretend it was an easy sell. But after spending a decade as a journalist 
writing about rising income inequality and 2 years as an elected politician trying to 
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do something about it, I’m convinced that the best chance that progressives have of 
bending the arc of the twenty-fi rst century economy is with a message of inclusive 
prosperity. That means wholeheartedly embracing capitalism while ensuring that 
the wealth it creates is broadly shared. And it means embracing capitalists and con-
vincing them that they, too, will benefi t when others get a bigger slice of the pie. 
 For many on the left, this approach seems worse than a crime; it seems to be a 
mistake. After all, what the nineteenth-century socialists used to call “objective 
conditions” today seem to be lining up on the side of a pugnacious, progressive 
agenda. 
 Income inequality is surging worldwide—as Oxfam notoriously pointed out in 
2014, 1 the combined wealth of the world’s 85 richest people that year was equal to 
the wealth of the globe’s bottom 50 %. CEO salaries are escalating—in 2012, the 
average CEO of a U.S. Fortune 500 company earned 350 times the salary of the 
average worker, compared to a ratio of 20 to 1 in the 1950s. 2 Meanwhile, middle 
class incomes have been stagnant or worse for the past three decades, and the econ-
omies of the western industrialized countries are barely growing. 
 There isn’t much trickling down and, crucially for progressives, public opinion 
seems to be noticing. The fi nancial crisis and the recession that followed it have 
made crony capitalism, especially where Wall Street is involved, an unavoidable 
issue for the right as well as the left. The hollowing out of middle class incomes, 
which had been masked by the pre-2008 credit bubble, was the starting point for 
both Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton when they launched their presidential campaigns. 
A 600-page tome by a French economist whose title evokes Marx is a best seller 
(Thomas Piketty’s  Capital in the Twenty-First Century ), and subpar growth across 
the western world has brought Keynes back into vogue. 
 Just as the stagfl ation of the 1970s set the stage for the Reagan and Thatcher 
revolution, now seems to be the moment for progressives to seize and reshape how 
we think about the political economy. The temptation is to go nuclear—to frame the 
plight of the twenty-fi rst century middle class as a zero-sum political battle the plu-
tocrats have been winning but whose outcome can now be reversed, to do to highly 
paid CEOs and billionaire hedge fund managers what Reagan and Thatcher did to 
unions and welfare recipients. Even Clinton, she of the $250,000 speeches to 
Goldman Sachs, is now calling for the “toppling” of the 1 %. 3 
 But there’s one big problem with this strategy. It isn’t working. The most recent 
example is Britain, where the Labour Party this spring suffered its greatest defeat in 
three decades. Peter Mandelson, the former Labour cabinet minister and a leading 
1  Oxfam International, “Even It Up: Time to End Extreme Inequality,”  https://www.oxfam.org/en/
campaigns/even-it-up 
2  Gretchen Gavett, “CEOs Get Paid Too Much, According to Pretty Much Everyone in the World,” 
 Harvard Business Review , September 23, 2014,  https://hbr.org/2014/09/ceos-get-paid-too-much-
according-to-pretty-much-everyone-in-the-world/ 
3  Amy Chozick, “Campaign Casts Hillary Clinton as the Populist It Insists She Has Always Been,” 




strategist in Tony Blair’s three successful elections, argues that the defeat happened 
because Labour misplayed the issue of rising income inequality. 4 
 The mistake wasn’t emphasizing Labour’s egalitarian values and its belief in 
government’s mission to “lean against inequality.” In fact, Mandelson has praised 
Ed Miliband, the former Labour leader, for identifying the winner-take-all economy 
as a central issue for our time and spotting the essential fact that “since the global 
fi nancial crisis, the public’s intolerance for inequality has turned to outright anger 
about the polarization of incomes between the very rich and the rest.” 
 But Mandelson believes Miliband struck the wrong note in his response to rising 
income inequality: “The bigger reason Labour lost the argument is that the British, 
on the whole, do not like income disparities being turned into class war. Earlier in 
his leadership, Mr. Miliband fought on a platform of social justice and fairness, 
using the language of ‘one nation.’ In the campaign, he seemed intent on pitting one 
half of the nation against the other.” 
 There are good reasons to think Americans are equally averse to an eat-the-rich 
political response to income inequality. A growing body of research suggests that 
the connection between rising income inequality and public support for redistribu-
tion in the United States is a lot more tenuous than progressive common sense might 
suggest. 
 “Numerous political theorists suggest that rising inequality and the shift in the 
distribution of income to those at the top should lead to increasing support for lib-
eral policies,” Matthew Luttig, of the University of Minnesota, argues in a 2013 
paper. “But recent evidence contradicts these theories. I empirically evaluate a 
number of competing theoretical predictions about the relationship between inequal-
ity and public preferences. In general, the evidence supports the claim that rising 
inequality has been a force promoting conservatism in the American public.” 
 A separate study, by a group of scholars including Emmanuel Saez, Piketty’s 
long-time collaborator and a leading income inequality researcher, confi rmed that 
fi nding: “The median-voter theorem predicts that an increase in the demand for 
redistribution would accompany this rise in income concentration (Meltzer and 
Richard  1981 ). However, time-series evidence from survey data does not support 
this prediction. If anything, the General Social Survey shows there has been a slight 
decrease in stated support for redistribution in the U.S. since the 1970s, even among 
those who self-identify as having below-average income” (Kuziemko et al.  2013 ). 
 That’s a terrible paradox for liberals. Rising income inequality, which makes 
progressive policies—including more redistribution—more urgent than ever, does 
not seem to be shifting public opinion in favor of such measures. The changing 
income distribution may even be making people more conservative. 
 There’s now a lively and agonized debate among liberals about why that may be 
the case. One cause is surely the extent to which, over the past four decades, conser-
vatives have shaped the ways in which all of us think about the economy. While the 
left was fi ghting—and winning—the culture war on values, the right was fi ghting—
4  Peter Mandelson, “Why Labour Lost the Election,” op-ed,  New York Times, May 19, 2015,  http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/opinion/peter-mandelson-why-labour-lost-the-election.html 
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and winning—the culture war on the economy. From “Tax Freedom Day,” to the 
“death tax,” to debt and defi cits, since the Reagan and Thatcher revolution, the right 
has defi ned and dominated the economic debate in the western industrialized world. 
 But another factor may be a new economic reality that progressive critics of 
surging income inequality can fi nd diffi cult to acknowledge. Crony capitalism—
that rigged economic game Elizabeth Warren speaks of so powerfully—is only one 
of the drivers of surging incomes at the top. Another is the “winner-take-all” 5 struc-
ture of the twenty-fi rst century globalized knowledge economy, and the undeniable 
fact that at least some of the winners are succeeding because they are transforming 
our lives in valuable ways: Being a Steve Jobs delivers better returns than ever 
before for the particular genius entrepreneur, but it also happens to offer less 
employment for everyone else. Consider this—in the 1950s, when Detroit was 
America’s engine of innovation, General Motors employed over 600,000 people. 
Today, when Silicon Valley is at the forefront of the technology revolution, two of 
its leading companies, Facebook and Google, employ jointly just 60,000. 
 Intuitively, Americans understand what is happening—they know that their 
wages and their jobs are being hollowed out, but they also realize that Silicon Valley 
whiz kids are driving the process just as surely as Wall Street banksters are. And 
they know that while the technology revolution that the late Jobs had led with his 
peers is threatening their incomes and security as workers, it is also vastly improv-
ing their experience as consumers. Like the early industrial revolution, today’s 
wave of technological change is having a contradictory impact on those of us in the 
99%—enriching our material lives even as it hollows out our jobs and wages. That’s 
why, even in an age of rising income inequality and increasing middle class insecu-
rity, the technology giants who are in the vanguard of the transformation are more 
likely to be lionized than reviled—witness the spontaneous iPad- and iPhone-lit 
vigils after Jobs’ death. 
 The temptation for progressives is to view this sympathy for the plutocrats as 
what Marxists used to call “false consciousness”: Bedazzled by the conservative 
message machine, unfortunate Americans are simply failing to recognize their true 
self-interest. That’s the implicit view, for instance, of a recent scholarly study that 
concludes that middle class Americans who don’t support redistribution are “pris-
oners of the American Dream” (Manza and Brooks forthcoming). 
 Jeff Manza, of New York University, and Clem Brooks, of Indiana University, 
take as their starting point the contradiction identifi ed by Luttig and Saez—that, 
despite rising income inequality, “Americans have not increased their hostility to 
either inequality or the rich, nor have they increased support for redistributive taxes 
in recent decades.” Their answer is belief in the American dream, which, they con-
clude, “is associated with signifi cantly lower support for taxes and equality” (Ibid.). 
 But telling people they are brainwashed is rarely a good political strategy, and in 
this case it isn’t even entirely true. In fact, the American Dream, in its narrow, 
hyper-meritocratic manifestation, is very much alive and well: In 1982, just 40 % of 
5  Alan Krueger, “Land of Hope and Dreams: Rock and Roll, Economics, and Rebuilding the 
Middle Class” (remarks, Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, Cleveland, June 12, 2013). 
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those on the Forbes 400 list of the richest Americans were self-made—they had 
built the businesses from which they derived their fortunes, not inherited them; by 
2011, that fi gure had risen to 69 % (Kaplan and Rauh  2013 ). 
 The problem isn’t rewards for the very best and the very brightest—lucky and 
smart and hard-working meritocrats are more richly compensated than ever in 
today’s winner-take-all economy. What’s going wrong in today’s political economy 
is that jobs for those in the middle, and future opportunities for their children, are 
vanishing. 
 In a recent essay lamenting the lack of “sustained resistance to wealth inequal-
ity” in the United States, my compatriot Naomi Klein suggests this passivity is 
because, unlike leftist activists during the original Gilded Age, today we are “fully 
in capitalism’s matrix” and are therefore unable to believe “in something else 
entirely.” 6 
 That’s true—and most of us don’t think it is a bad thing. We’ve tried the com-
munist alternative, after all, and it didn’t work out so well. The dominant concern 
about capitalism today isn’t that it is failing as an economic engine—most goods 
and many services are getting ever cheaper and more abundant. Our complaint is 
that our political economy is doing a poor job of sharing the fruits of this twenty- 
fi rst century capitalist cornucopia. 
 That’s why income inequality is an essential issue for progressives, but also a 
complicated one. Most Americans understand that capitalism works as an economic 
system—just not as a social one—and that many of our most successful capitalists 
are the people responsible for its effectiveness. 
 This meritocratic effectiveness of the 1% is why the right wins when it succeeds 
in casting calls for more redistribution as a punishment of success. As former 
President Bill Clinton put it at his fl agship conference last September, “I don’t think 
most Americans resent someone doing well. They resent it if they’re not getting a 
fair deal, too.” 7 That’s why eating the rich isn’t the best way of making the case for 
more redistributive economic policy. We need to persuade the plutocrats them-
selves to embrace the idea, too. (For discussion on how Americans overall view 
inequality and approaches to address it, see Chap.  12 .) 
 This is less of a paradox than you may think. Warren Buffett is right when he 
quips that there is a class war today—and that his class is winning. But the smartest 
plutocrats are starting to understand that mass democracy and an economic order 
skewed so strongly in favor of the 0.1 % won’t be compatible for long. That’s why 
socially minded pursuits like impact investing, corporate social responsibility, and 
inclusive capitalism are the high-status hobbies of many of today’s plutocrats. 
 And warning that capitalism needs to do a better job of serving the middle class 
or it is doomed has become something of a mini-trend among the super-rich. Nick 
6  Naomi Klein, review of  The Age of Acquiescence by Steve Fraser,  New York Times, March 16, 
2015,  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/books/review/the-age-of-acquiescence-by-steve-fra-
ser.html 
7  Associated Press, “Bill Clinton Defends Wife’s Commitment to Poor,  Politico, June 24, 2014, 
 http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/bill-clinton-hillary-clinton-poor-108249.html 
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Hanauer, a billionaire Seattle entrepreneur and tech investor, has written an open 
letter to his fellow “zillionaires,” cautioning that: “If we don’t do something to fi x 
the glaring inequities in this economy, the pitchforks are going to come for us. No 
society can sustain this kind of rising inequality. In fact, there is no example in 
human history where wealth accumulated like this and the pitchforks didn’t eventu-
ally come out. You show me a highly unequal society, and I will show you a police 
state. Or an uprising. There are no counterexamples. None. It’s not if, it’s when.” 8 
 Paul Tudor Jones, a Connecticut billionaire hedge fund manager who started his 
career trading cotton futures in New Orleans, sounded a similar warning in a TED 
talk in March 2015, predicting that “that gap between the wealthiest and the poorest, 
it will get closed. History always does it,” but predicting that history’s unwelcome 
tool might be war or revolution. 9 A better approach, Jones argued, was to build a 
fairer version of capitalism: “Capitalism has to be based on justice. It has to be, and 
now more than ever, with economic divisions growing wider every day. It’s esti-
mated that 47 % of American workers can be displaced in the next 20 years. I’m not 
against progress. I want the driverless car and the jet pack just like everyone else. 
But I’m pleading for recognition that with increased wealth and profi ts has to come 
greater corporate social responsibility.” 
 Of course, it is one thing to support inclusive capitalism in theory, or a few char-
ter schools, or some women entrepreneurs in Africa, or, in the case of Goldman 
Sachs, 10,000 small businesses. It’s quite another to tolerate higher taxes on your 
own income bracket. As Larry Summers, the former Secretary of the Treasury and 
chair of a recent  Center for American Progress report called  Inclusive Capitalism , 
put it— “A lot of CEOs ask me how they can help build a more inclusive capitalism. 
I tell them there is a simple place to start—pay more taxes.” 10 
 It is time to remember that this is something civic-minded American business 
leaders were actually willing to do and to support in the postwar era. In 1950, to pay 
for the Korean War, America’s two main business organizations proposed a pack-
age of tax increases including raising the corporate tax to 50%, a special additional 
tax on the defense industry (which would profi t from war spending) and a tempo-
rary increase in the income tax rate. In 1956, America’s leading business group 
called for a fuel tax to pay for highway building. 
 These and a dozen other similar episodes of pro-tax lobbying by American cor-
porate chiefs, carefully documented by University of Michigan sociologist Mark 
Mizruchi in a 2013 book, seem almost fantastical today. 
8  Nick Hanauer, “The Pitchforks Are Coming … for Us Plutocrats,”  Politico Magazine, July/
August 2014,  http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-
us-plutocrats-108014.html 
9  See TED website at  https://www.ted.com/talks/paul_tudor_jones_ii_why_we_need_to_rethink_
capitalism 
10  Larry Summers, personal communication, April 2015. 
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 The willingness of postwar American business leaders to advocate higher taxes 
is even more astonishing because both companies and their bosses paid taxes at a 
much higher rate at the time than they do now. Corporate taxes accounted for around 
a quarter of all federal tax revenues in 1965. Today, companies pay around 10% of 
total revenue, and their share is dropping. 11 Personal tax rates on the wealthy used 
to be unthinkably high by today’s standards, too—in 1963, the top tax rate was 
91%. 
 There’s a reason we called them the Greatest Generation—the elites of yester-
year were paid less and taxed more, yet they were much more willing to support 
further tax increases than their equivalents are today. 
 Progressives should call on the grandchildren of those postwar elites to do the 
same today. Even if only a fraction of the plutocrats are persuaded, middle class 
Americans will respond better to arguments that seek to include the winners of 
twenty-fi rst century capitalism rather than demonize them. 
 On that balmy June evening speaking to the 1% gathered poolside in Toronto, I 
described going skating with my three children a few months earlier at the local 
public rink, just a few blocks away. As we made our way on to the ice, the richest 
man in Canada and his youngest daughter whizzed past. I had worked for his com-
panies in the past, and we stopped to chat. He was enthusiastic about the rink—in 
his opinion, the nicest in town. 
 I had moved back to Canada just a couple of years earlier. I had been living in 
Moscow, London, and New York and writing a book about plutocrats, describing 
how they were forming a global community of peers, walled off from everyone 
else—a sort of virtual Galt’s Gulch, Ayn Rand’s fantasy valley to which her super-
men retreated to escape the parasitic proletarians. The billionaire at the public skat-
ing rink, I told my 1% listeners, was illustrative of an inclusive society that had 
vanished in much of the world and was under threat even in Canada, where income 
inequality has increased over the past three decades but the chasm is still smaller 
than in the United States (TD Economics  2014 ; Corak  2013 ). 12 
 All of us have a stake in preserving, building, or recovering inclusive prosper-
ity—not least the plutocrats. Because, ultimately, there can be no Galt’s Gulch. 
What Ben Franklin said at the signing of the Declaration of Independence is true of 
capitalist democracies today writ large: “We must hang together or, assuredly, we 
shall hang separately.” 
11  David Wessel, “How to Read Obama’s New Budget,” Brookings Institution website, February 26, 2014, 
 http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/26-how-to-read-obamas-new-budget-wessel 
12  In 1982, the top 1 % accounted for 7.1 % of the national income in Canada. By 2012, that share 
had increased to 10.3 %. Over the same span, the share of national income going to the top 0.1 % 
in Canada doubled from 2.5 to 5 %. This a big shift, but Canada is still much less unequal than the 
United States—the share of income going to the 1 % in Canada today is roughly the same as the 
share taken by the 0.1 % in the United States. 
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